The authors of the article consider one of the directions of musical pedagogy - the use of art pedagogy in the process of training a musician-performer. Based on the analysis of the research literature and experience describes the possibility of using psychological reserves of music and performing activities, in particular, reception of musical color modeling of the emotional and figurative content of music, are revealed.

No nation can exist without its own religious cults and traditions. The practical absence of records of the presence of pagan priests in our ancestors, the bearers of knowledge, beliefs and rituals, testifies only to the careful deliberate destruction of important aspects of national history. Some pages in the history of the Eastern Slavs are simply crossed out from the chronicles and replaced by pious stories in line with Byzantine hagiography. An example in this regard is the description of the (...) baptism of Kiev under Prince Vladimir, which obviously had nothing to do with the real events. The pagan rites and traditions in the annals were changed beyond recognition and took the form of fairy tales and legends. Very interesting in this regard are the descriptions of the funeral rites related to the death of Prince Igor, which were transformed by the chronicler Nestor into the legend "On the revenge of Princess Olga Derevlyany". Even the term "priest" in ancient Slavic sources was replaced by the word "magician" or "old man". Because of all these facts, a fairly authoritative hypothesis has emerged in national historical science, according to which the Eastern Slavs did not have any "pagan priests" at all. (shrink)

Leibniz’s philosophy enjoyed a Russian fandom that endured from the eighteenth century to the death of the last exiled Russian philosophers in the twentieth century. There was, to begin with, Leibniz’s direct impact on Peter the Great and on the scientific development of Saint Petersburg. Then there was, still in the eighteenth century, Mikhail Lomonosov, who was sent to study with Christian Wolff in Marburg, and who came back to Saint Petersburg with a watered-down Leibnizian worldview, which he applied to (...) the study of chemistry and physics. Another eighteenth century philosopher, Alexander Radishchev, who studied in Leipzig, displayed acquiescence with a number of key elements from Leibniz’s philosophy. Russian Lebnizianism as a continuous philosophical movement was considerably reinvigorated in the 1870s when the Leibnizian German philosopher Gustav Teichmüller took a position at the University of Dorpat (nowadays Tartu, Estonia), which was then located within the Russian Empire. Teichmüller influenced a number of Russian philosophers into adopting a “Teichmüllerian” version of Leibnizianism. Among these philosophers were Evgeny Bobrov and Alexei Kozlov. In Saint Petersburg, Kozlov influenced his own son, Askoldov, and the latter’s friend — Nikolai Lossky. In the meanwhile, in Moscow Lev Lopatin, Nikolai Bugaev, and Petr Astafiev developed their own Leibnizianism in seemingly relative independence from Teichmüller’s influence and presumably, in some cases, under the partial influence of Vladimir Solovyov. Despite this relative independence, however, the fact remains that there was in late nineteenth and early twentieth century Russia a network of more or less loosely interconnected Leibnizian philosophers who read each other and wrote about each other, who exchanged ideas, and who constituted a movement that we might characterize as “Russian Leibnizianism” or “Russian Neo-Leibnizianism.” In this chapter, I tell the story of the intellectual lineage of Russian Leibnizianism. (shrink)

This book offers a comprehensive account of logic that addresses fundamental issues concerning the nature and foundations of the discipline. The authors claim that these foundations can not only be established without the need for strong metaphysical assumptions, but also without hypostasizing logical forms as specific entities. They present a systematic argument that the primary subject matter of logic is our linguistic interaction rather than our private reasoning and it is thus misleading to see logic as revealing "the laws of (...) thought". In this sense, fundamental logical laws are implicit to our "language games" and are thus more similar to social norms than to the laws of nature. Peregrin and Svoboda also show that logical theories, despite the fact that they rely on rules implicit to our actual linguistic practice, firm up these rules and make them explicit. By carefully scrutinizing the project of logical analysis, the authors demonstrate that logical rules can be best seen as products of the so called reflective equilibrium. They suggest that we can profit from viewing languages as "inferential landscapes" and logicians as "geographers" who map them and try to pave safe routes through them. This book is an essential resource for scholars and researchers engaged with the foundations of logical theories and the philosophy of language. (shrink)

We examine some of Connes’ criticisms of Robinson’s infinitesimals starting in 1995. Connes sought to exploit the Solovay model S as ammunition against non-standard analysis, but the model tends to boomerang, undercutting Connes’ own earlier work in functional analysis. Connes described the hyperreals as both a “virtual theory” and a “chimera”, yet acknowledged that his argument relies on the transfer principle. We analyze Connes’ “dart-throwing” thought experiment, but reach an opposite conclusion. In S , all definable sets of reals are (...) Lebesgue measurable, suggesting that Connes views a theory as being “virtual” if it is not definable in a suitable model of ZFC. If so, Connes’ claim that a theory of the hyperreals is “virtual” is refuted by the existence of a definable model of the hyperreal field due to Kanovei and Shelah. Free ultrafilters aren’t definable, yet Connes exploited such ultrafilters both in his own earlier work on the classification of factors in the 1970s and 80s, and in Noncommutative Geometry, raising the question whether the latter may not be vulnerable to Connes’ criticism of virtuality. We analyze the philosophical underpinnings of Connes’ argument based on Gödel’s incompleteness theorem, and detect an apparent circularity in Connes’ logic. We document the reliance on non-constructive foundational material, and specifically on the Dixmier trace −∫ (featured on the front cover of Connes’ magnum opus) and the Hahn–Banach theorem, in Connes’ own framework. We also note an inaccuracy in Machover’s critique of infinitesimal-based pedagogy. (shrink)

This article seeks to clarify the concept of progress in philosophy. It treats progress as a kind of development. But not every development is a progress. When we talk about progress, what really matters is the direction of development. In some cases it is relatively easy to reach agreement about this direction. But not in the case of philosophy, if we abstract it from the obvious and the trivial, like the number of books on philosophy. As a result, the article (...) concludes that there cannot be progress in philosophy. Instead we see a continual multiplication of interpretations. (shrink)

Ecological humanism is a new broadened form of human ethics that coming into being as an answer to an ecological crisis and an ideology of total consumption. There are two approaches in basing of ecological humanism. The first of them is founded on traditional human values or on anthropocentrism. Milieu is considered as important living conditions that must be conserved with great care but the number of one is man here. The second approach is more radical. It strives to overcome (...) anthropological egoism and is based on Earth-altruism. Its credo can be presented as general weal for all geobiocoenosis. Good is all that helps to preserve integrity, stability and beauty of Earth-community. Stable development can be defined as safeguarding of human living inharmony with ecological systems. As it is well known, 57-th session of UNO announced that 2005-2014 years will be devoted to a program of education for stable development. The Mongolian Government asseverated a national program of ecological education for Mongolia from 1997. Its main object was a forming of common ecological culture for stable development. This program provided:‐ ecological training for common life‐ laying organizing structures and law grounds‐ co-ordinating tacks of stable development with other national projects‐ including ecological knowledge in educational programs.We think also that there is need to elaborate new human ethics that could provide new common living culture for Mongols. There is ecological ethics or ecological humanism that, above all, will remove a tradition of human predominance over nature and establish equality between human beings and animate nature. (shrink)

Can a machine understand the meanings of natural language? Recent developments in the generative large language models (LLMs) of artificial intelligence have led to the belief that traditional philosophical assumptions about machine understanding of language need to be revised. This article critically evaluates the prevailing tendency to regard machine language performance as mere syntactic manipulation and the imitations of understanding, which is only partial and very shallow, without sufficient grounding in the world. The article analyses the views on possible ways (...) of grounding as a condition for successful understanding in LLMs and offers an alternative way in view of the prevailing belief that the success of understanding depends mainly on the referential grounding. An alternative conception seeks to show that semantic fragmentism offers a viable account of natural language understanding and explains how LLMs ground the meanings of linguistic expressions. Uncovering how meanings are grounded allows us to also explain why LLMs’ ability to understand is possible and so remarkably successful. (shrink)

Книга предназначена для специалистов и всех, кто интересуется этой проблемой.

Философия науки возникла в итоге неспособности теории познания ответить на важные вопросы, вставшие перед научным сообществом в конце XIX века. И в дальнейшем философия науки и теория познания шли каждая свом путем, оказывая друг на друга немалое влияние, но ставя и решаявесьма разные задачи. Главным различием между ними является то, что эпистемология является теоретическим видом знания, тогда как философия науки – посттеоретическая дисциплина. Эпистемология – это теория, включающая в себя объяснительную схему, это философский проект познания, это дисциплина, содержащая набор запретов (...) и предписаний. Философия науки представляет собой изучение научногопоиска как состоявшегося реального события, а также экспертную оценку результатов. Философия науки предполагает критическое и рефлексивное сравнение проекта и результата, тогда как теория познания совершенствует нормативы и регулятивы познавательной активности. Там, где теория познания создает метод и сама опирается на метод, философия науки обходится историко‐критической рефлексией, логико-грамматическим анализом, поиском культурных или социальных детерминант. (shrink)

The Lazy Argument, as it is preserved in historical testimonies, is not logically conclusive. In this form, it appears to have been proposed in favor of part-time fatalism (including past time fatalism). The argument assumes that free will assumption is unacceptable from the standpoint of the logical fatalist but plausible for some of the nonuniversal or part-time fatalists. There are indications that the layout of argument is not genuine, but taken over from a Megarian source and later transformed. The genuine (...) form of the argument seems to be given in different form and far closer to Megarian logical fatalism and its purpose is not to defend laziness. If the historical argument has to lead to a logically satisfactory solution, some additional assumptions and additional tuning is needed. (shrink)

Deceptionism about lying is the view that all lies are intended to deceive. This view sits uneasily with some cases that seem to involve lies not intended to deceive. We call these lies bald-faced because the liar lies while believing that the hearer knows that they are lying. The most recent deceptionist argument put forward by Rudnicki and Odrowąż-Sypniewska (this journal) defends the view that all genuine bald-faced lies are intended to deceive some of their hearers. I argue that this (...) argument is interesting but problematic: its premises do not support the view that all bald-faced lies are intended to deceive but rather only that some people who bald-faced lie to institutions or large audiences intend to deceive someone. Also, genuine bald-faced lies addressed at institutions are intended to (non-deceptively) manipulate institutions rather than deceive anyone. (shrink)

Knowledge representation, which lies at the core of artificial intelligence, is concerned with encoding knowledge on computers to enable systems to reason automatically. The aims are to help readers make their computer smarter, handle qualitative and uncertain information, and improve computational tractability.

The paper deals with the possible readings of The Reaper Argument premisses. Some conjectures related to the Stoics’ alleged proof of the argument are discussed.

Estamos acostumbrados a hablar del fascismo y sus variantes contemporáneas como «enemigos de la cultura», como una fuerza política animada por el desprecio hacia las artes. Sin embargo, es evidente la extrema importancia que el fascismo concede al ámbito de la cultura; sus batallas culturales son procesos constitutivos centrales de sus luchas. Creo que pasaremos por alto dimensiones fundamentales del fenómeno fascista si no lo entendemos como una batalla por la formación de la sensibilidad social, por el cultivo de los (...) afectos y por la producción del horizonte sensible de la política. El orden sensible es el fundamento de la imaginación social, de sus límites y formas, y el control de la imaginación y la sensibilidad es el fundamento de todo poder. En la medida en que es consciente de ello, el fascismo es un proyecto estético, una reconstrucción de la sensibilidad que define los límites de lo visible y lo perceptible dentro del orden social. Lo que propongo aquí es comprender la dinámica de la actualización de tal revolución cultural fascista, teniendo en cuenta el estadio actual de los procesos materiales de reproducción cultural en las sociedades capitalistas. (shrink)

This paper argues against Galen Strawson’s criticism of the narrativist identity thesis. Strawson points out that the narrativist thesis fails to portray those with an episodic perception of themselves. I claim that episodicity is rather problematic and that we should question the validity of this notion. The first step in this goal is to decipher Strawson’s basis of the self which is an amalgam between the cultural and social and is perceived differently by different people. Afterwards, I will try to (...) use the claims derived from Strawson’s basis and apply the critique of his method. I pose a question about the relationship between episodic and diachronic and, ultimately, argue that both culturally and biologically, assuming the diachronic aspect of the self is necessary, apart from the very small number of cases. In this sense, the main conclusion is that Strawson’s thesis is limiting but does not pose a valid alternative to the narrativist identity thesis. (shrink)

Comparative philosophical studies can seek to fit some Eastern patterns of thought into the general philosophical framework, or, on the contrary, to improve understanding of Western ones through the view "from abroad". I try to hit both marks by means of establishing, firstly, the parallels between Indian versions of theodicy and the Hellenic and Christian ones, then by defining to which of five types of Western theodicy the Advaita-Vedanta and Nyaya versions belong and, thirdly, by considering the meaning of the (...) fact that some varieties of Western theodicy, like the explanation of evil by free will and divine dispensation aiming at the improvement of man, have Indian counterparts while others lack them. Some considerations concerning the remainders of primordial monotheisms ("an argument from theodicy") under the thick layers of other religious world-outlooks are also offered to the reader at the end of the article. (shrink)

Tato stať ("K pojmu "přirozeného zákona" - bytí lidsky jsoucího - v Lockově filosofii") je dodatkem k mé studii "K pojmu "přirozeného zákona" (bytí lidsky jsoucího) v Hobbesově filosofii". Určuji v ní blíže momenty totožnosti pojmu "přirozeného zákona" (bytí lidsky jsoucího) v Lockově filosofii a pojmu "přirozeného zákona" (bytí lidsky jsoucího) ve filosofii Hobbesově, tj. bytný zdroj, (obsažnou) bytnost a (bytostnou) formu "přirozeného zákona" (bytí lidsky jsoucího) a bytný zdroj, (obsažnou) bytnost a (bytostnou) formu (státo-právně) společenského zákona (bytí lidsky jsoucího). (...) A určuji v ní též blíže momenty rozdílnosti pojmu "přirozeného zákona" (bytí lidsky jsoucího) v Lockově filosofii a pojmu "přirozeného zákona" (bytí lidsky jsoucího) ve filosofii Hobbesově, tj. platnost (závaznost) "přirozeného zákona" (bytí lidsky jsoucího), platnost (závaznost) (státo-právně) společenského zákona (bytí lidsky jsoucího) a vztah "přirozeného zákona" (bytí lidsky jsoucího) a (státo-právně) společenského zákona (bytí lidsky jsoucího). Tato stať ("K pojmu "přirozeného zákona" - bytí lidsky jsoucího - v Lockově filosofii"), jsouc dodatkem k mé studii "K pojmu "přirozeného zákona" (bytí lidsky jsoucího) v Hobbesově filosofii", ukazuje, že pojem "přirozeného zákona" (bytí lidsky jsoucího) v Lockově filosofii je antropologicko-ontologicko-nomologicky širší a hlubší než pojem "přirozeného zákona" (bytí lidsky jsoucího) ve filosofii Hobbesově; a ukazuje též, že pojem "přirozeného zákona" (bytí lidsky jsoucího) v Lockově filosofii, ač antropologicko-ontologicko-nomologicky širší a hlubší než pojem "přirozeného zákona" (bytí lidsky jsoucího) v Hobbesově filosofii, není pojmem mravního zákona (bytí lidsky jsoucího) a nepředbíhá ani nepředjímá ani Kantův pojem mravního zákona (bytí lidsky jsoucího). (shrink)

The subject of this study is the participants in artificial sociality (humans and artificial intelligence (AI) tools) and communication between them. The first section analyses (using Luhmann’s methodology) communication as the basis of sociality. The second section shows how AI tools became social technologies in the framework of artificial sociality. The third section describes experimental communication between authors and AI tools (the case of ChatGPT). For the first time in the Baltic countries, the authors examined sociological, humanitarian, natural and technological (...) aspects of the functioning AI tools, which participate in creation of a new social reality for human society – artificial sociality. (shrink)

Tato stať - recenze - "Od polovzdělanosti k nevzdělanosti" - se zabývá knihou K. P. Liessmanna "Teorie nevzdělanosti"; v jejích stopách promýšlí a domýšlí tyto otázky: 1. Jaký je dřívější zakládající a zacilující vztah k ideji vzdělanosti? 2. Jaký je nynější vztah k ideji vzdělanosti, zakládající se mimo ni a zacilující se proti ní? 3. Jaká je zakládající a zacilující antiidea dnešního "vzdělávání"? 4. Jaká je zakládající a zacilující antiidea "vzdělávání" v dnešních "vzdělávacích institucích", zvláště pak ve školách jako "vzdělávacích (...) institucích"? 5. Jaký je bytný základ zakládající a zacilující antiideje dnešního "vzdělávání" (tj. i jaký je bytný základ zakládající a zacilující antiideje "vzdělávání" v dnešních "vzdělávacích institucích", tj. i ve školách jako "vzdělávacích institucích")? - Tato recenzní stať - "Od polovzdělanosti k nevzdělanosti", zabývajíc se knihou K. P. Liessmanna "Teorie nevzdělanosti" a v jejích stopách promýšlejíc a domýšlejíc ony otázky, dodává dodatek o struktuře dnešního školství, dle nějž struktura dnešního školství tkví v rozdělení na vyšší školy - továrny a nižší školy - stoky i v propojení vyšších škol - továren a nižších škol - stok posuvnou hranicí, tj. hranicí posuvnou pouze směrem nahoru, nikoli ovšem směrem dolů. (shrink)

Tato stať - "Úvod do dějepisu jako společenské vědy" - se zabývá těmito otázkami: 1. Co je dějepis a čím se zabývá? 2. Zabývá-li se dějepis též a zvláště smyslem společensko-lidských dějin, mají společensko-lidské dějiny smysl, a mají-li smysl, tedy jaký? 3. Ať již mají, či nemají nějaký smysl, jaký možný smysl má studium dějepisu, resp. jaký možný smysl studium dějepisu může mít a kdy jej může mít? - Zabývajíc se těmito otázkami, je tato stať úvodem do společenských věd jako (...) s dějepisem spjatých a jím vázaných vazbou jejich logického principu s jejich principem historickým. (shrink)

The parameter-free part \(\textbf{PA}_2^*\) of \(\textbf{PA}_2\), second order Peano arithmetic, is considered. We make use of a product/iterated Sacks forcing to define an \(\omega \) -model of \(\textbf{PA}_2^*+ \textbf{CA}(\Sigma ^1_2)\), in which an example of the full Comprehension schema \(\textbf{CA}\) fails. Using Cohen’s forcing, we also define an \(\omega \) -model of \(\textbf{PA}_2^*\), in which not every set has its complement, and hence the full \(\textbf{CA}\) fails in a rather elementary way.

During the late Soviet era, science fiction was one of the first zones of its ideological cosmos, registering the exhaustion of the communist utopia precisely within the literary genre aimed at its representation. In this article I consider the history of the “editing to death” of the Strugatsky brothers’ short novel Roadside Picnic as a representative case of the anti-utopian “uneasiness in civilization” of late actually existing socialism. Simultaneously with the censorship taming of the uneasiness, the Strugatsky’s science fiction dystopia (...) underwent a radical interpretation in Andrei Tarkovsky’s film adaptation Stalker as a Hegelian “good music with text”. In comparison to the censored edition, which is barely a timid emendation, ultimately yearning modestly for a good life during the most consumeristic and moderately repressive years of Soviet power, Tarkovsky’s aesthetically singular re-reading is truly a “Zone” of editing to death. (shrink)

The paper focuses its attention on the opacities and ambiguities that concern the meaning of the term “normative attitude” as it is used in two versions of inferentialism – in Brandom’s foundational inferentialist system and in Peregrin’s naturalized version of inferentialism. It suggests that both authors oscillate between viewing normative attitudes as publically accessible affairs and as private states/events hidden from the sight of others. Given the pivotal role of the term and the fact that the relevant private and public (...) sides are not always in harmony, this is quite problematic. The paper suggests that instead of focusing on normative attitudes inferentialists should consider focusing on corrective (re)actions and on the relationships between people that they establish. Such a move might yield a more robust concept of normativity suitable for the theoretical edifice of naturalized inferentialism. (shrink)